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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law has undergone an obscure but startling revolution. Recent
cases have overturned a century and a half of interpretation regarding one very
critical section of the Bankruptcy Code. In the past, professionals with
malpractice liability could use bankruptcy protection to shield themselves.
Today, professionals can depend on no such protection. The Code no longer
allows professionals to avoid the consequences of their malpractice. Oddly
enough, this revolution has occurred with little fanfare or comment.
From 18411 until 1994, professionals2 who sought bankruptcy protection
* B.A. (Special Honors) 1978, University of Texas. J.D., 1982, University of Texas School
of Law. The author directed a corporate litigation section prosecuting civil professional liability
claims during the "savings and loan crisis." He wishes to acknowledge Professor Jack Williams
of the Georgia State University School of Law for yeoman's effort in reviewing and critiquing
drafts of this work. Of course, all of the ill-considered opinions, errors and failures of analysis
in this work are strictly the author's own.
1. See infra note 70 for a brief description of the innovative inclusion of non-merchants in
the class of debtors eligible for bankruptcy protection under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.
2. This article uses the term "professional" to refer to attorneys, accountants, physicians, and
1
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could safely presume an ability to discharge any malpractice liability they
might incur. Such a presumption was no further afield than the prospect of
discharging consumer or commercial debt. Any attorney, physician, or
corporate director who abused a client's trust could shield himself by seeking
refuge in bankruptcy. Ironically, bankruptcy, the equitable remedy,3 became
the protector of inequitable conduct. This intolerable situation could not
continue forever. By the mid-1980s, a smattering of courts had begun to
explore ways to deny the discharge of professional liability claims. Indeed, by
the summer of 1994, a pattern of holdings in the bankruptcy courts revealed
that a revolution was in progress. Taken together, two 1986 cases4 and a
recent 1994 opinion5 have profoundly changed the bankruptcy world for
professionals.
Part I of this article analyzes the liabilities that professionals face in
bankruptcy that do not involve malpractice. To provide background for the
analysis that follows, part II explores the traditional bankruptcy rules that
practically assured a professional discharge for liability incurred through
negligence or malpractice. Finally, part III considers the cases that heralded
the change in treatment of professionals in bankruptcy and argues that these
cases amount to a revolution.
H. THE NON-PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS
Until the advent of the cases that form the basis for this article, a
professional who sought protection in bankruptcy was treated the same as
every other debtor in bankruptcy. Early on, the courts did not distinguish
professionals from tradesmen. 6 Perhaps for this reason, bankruptcy jurispru-
dence paid little attention to the origins of the liability from which debtors
sought bankruptcy protection.7 Courts assumed that the debtor-professional
corporate officers ordirectors, i.e., "those who undertake any work calling for special skill, [who
are] required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also to possess a standard
minimum of special knowledge and ability." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 1984).
3. "[C]ourts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently
proceedings in equity." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
4. Doucette v. Kwiat (In re Kwiat), 62 B.R. 818 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986), aff'd in part and
vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 81 B.R. 184 (D. Mass. 1987); Purcell v.
Janikowski (In re Janikowski), 60 B.R. 784 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
5. Energy Prods. Eng'g, Inc. v. Reuscher (In re Reuscher), 169 B.R. 398 (S.D. Ill. 1994).
6. Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines "debtor" but does not distinguish between
professionals and non-professionals. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Section 109, "Who may be a
debtor," sets out requirements for each chapter proceeding, and also makes no distinction, Id.
§ 109.
7. Some distinctions were made, but generally these differentiated only between the respective
rights of creditors and debtors. The distinction between secured and unsecured creditors, for
[Vol. 48:743
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needed protection (and for the most part was entitled to protection) from the
same two kinds of liability as all other debtors. These two basic types of
liability arose from either ordinary commercial, trade, or consumer debt,' or
from intentional tort claims.
For the most part, the Bankruptcy Code states a general rule about the
treatment of both these categories.9 More precisely, the Code's treatment of
the dischargeability ° of ordinary debt on the one hand and liability for
intentional torts on the other comes as close to a promulgation of bright-line
tests as anything in the Code ever does. Ordinary commercial, trade, and
consumer debt are either completely discharged" or discharged after a series
of payments pursuant to a payment plan. 2 Thus, debtor-professionals will
discover that the vast majority of their "trade" and consumer debt is
completely discharged under Chapters 7,13 11, 1 and 13.15
example, reflected the rights for which the creditor bargained. These early cases evidence an
assumption that claims against the bankruptcy estate were the products of debts which arose in
the normal course of business or life; therefore, the factual circumstances or background
supporting a particular claim did not matter. This article argues that claims for professional
malpractice present unique problems precisely because of the circumstances that spawn them.
8. This class of claims is absent from the exceptions to discharge set forth in § 523. 11
U.S.C. § 523 (1994). Therefore, the practitioner is left to define this class by what it does not
include.
9. The Bankruptcy Code may be unique in American jurisprudence in its failure to state
general rules. Other complex statutes (such as the Commercial Codes and the Internal Revenue
Code) first state general principles and then catalogue voluminous exceptions. In contrast, the
Bankruptcy Code consists of a thick volume of exceptions to a set of general rules never
explicitly and positively expressed by the statute itself but implicitly understood by practitioners.
10. This article uses the technically incorrect terms "dischargeable" and "nondischargeable"
to refer to two kinds of claims discussed throughout. More accurately, there are unexceptional
claims and exceptional claims. That is, there are claims that do not rise above the undifferentiated
mass of other debts from which the debtor seeks protection. These are discharged along with
other debt under the general rule that all unexceptional liabilities are discharged. The article refers
to these unexceptional claims as "dischargeable", although technically it is the corpus of claims
which are dischargeable, not any one claim. In contrast, exceptional claims either rise up out of
the mass of other claims to receive an exception to discharge under § 523 or § 727(b), or form
the basis for an objection to discharge under § 727(c)(1). The article refers to these exceptional
claims as "nondischargeable" or as "surviving bankruptcy," although this status only arises when
a party in interest seeks denial of the debtor's discharge by filing an adversary proceeding. Rather
than using the technically correct but indigestible terms "not excepted from discharge" and
'subject to exception from discharge" or "forming the basis for an objection to discharge," this
author opts for readability and the simpler terms.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1994).
12. See id. §§ 1141(d)(1)(A), 1328(a).
13. Under § 727(b), a discharge under Chapter 7 discharges "all debts," subject to exceptions
enumerated in § 727(a) and § 523. Id. § 727(b).
14. Under § 1141(d)(1)(A), the confirmation of a plan "discharges the debtor from any debt,"
except for those debts set out in § 523 and § 727(a). Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
15. Under Chapter 13 discharge is subject to contingency and limitation. Section 1328(a)
3
Elbein: An Obscure Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in Bankrupt
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:743
There is also a simply stated rule for intentional torts, but with significant
exceptions. In general, the Code does not favor the discharge of intentional
torts.16 Section 523(a) of the Code excepts most species of intentional torts
from discharge, including a broad category of actions that are "willful and
malicious, " 17 fraud in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny,"8 and
various kinds of claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and false pretense. 19
The Code's prejudice against intentional torts is so broad that even conduct
which is not intentional, but only grossly negligent, may survive the
bankruptcy discharge.' For example, § 523(a) excepts from discharge any
personal injury claim arising from driving under the influence of intoxi-
cants2 -an act which, at worst, constitutes only gross negligence.'
As previously mentioned, the Code contains exceptions to the general rule
of nondischargeability for intentional torts. The greatest of these exceptions is
found in Chapter 13. Specifically, all of the intentional torts catalogued above
receive a discharge if a Chapter 13 plan is confirmed.' This is so despite the
fact that certain acts of gross neglect are not discharged.2' In an odd twist,
requires that a debtor complete all payments under a plan before the debts provided for in the
plan can be discharged. The court may grant a complete discharge without satisfaction of the plan
when the debtor suffers some hardship pursuant to § 1328(b). It should be noted that even under
Chapter 13, however, some claims are excepted from discharge. See id. § 1328(a).
16. Note, for example, that most of the exceptions to discharge set out in § 523 and 727(a)
are either intentional torts or acts which are similar to intentional torts.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994).
18. Id. § 523(a)(4), quoted infra note 72.
19. Id. § 523(a)(2)-(3).
20. The Code's strict treatment of intentional torts reflects a long history. The first English
bankruptcy law, entitled "an act against such persons as do make bankrupts," 34 & 35 Hen. 8,
ch. 4. (1542-43) (Eng.), focused on fraudulent and absconding debtors and referred to debtors
as "offenders." The succeeding act, the 1705 Statute of 4 Anne, stated that a bankrupt convicted
of committing fraud "shall suffer as a felon, without benefit of clergy." 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 18
(1705) (Eng.). Charles Jordan Tabb points out that this lovely circumlocution "meant the death
penalty." Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 336 (1991).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).
22. It may be argued here that the inclusion of "driving while intoxicated" liability within §
523(a) is the result of pure politics, not an underlying policy of punishing intentional torts. It was
added to the Code with the 1984 amendments during a period when drunk driving was a cause
celebre at all levels of law enforcement. However, since all law-particularly legislation-is the
result of political process and therefore political pressure, such an argument would lead nowhere
useful. Moreover, even if this provision is exceptional, the other cited sections prove the disfavor
of intentional torts.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994).
24. Section 1328(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan ... the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts ... except any
debt-
4
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however, if a hardship discharge is granted, Chapter 13 reverts to a smaller
scope of dischargeability by incorporating the provisions of § 523(a)-negating
the exception altogether.'
Thus, professionals in bankruptcy can generally count on discharge of
their commercial and consumer debt but no protection for their intentional
torts, unless the professional completes a plan under Chapter 13. Because
bankruptcy law distinguished neither professionals from tradesmen or other
debtors nor liability for malpractice from other types of debt, malpractice
claims were formerly discharged like any other commercial or consumer debt.
This situation was particularly distressing to those creditors who entrusted their
intimate personal and financial affairs to a professional, only to find that
bankruptcy law shielded the professional from malpractice liability.
III. THE OLD RULES: NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE OF PROFESSIONALS
In the no-man's-land between dischargeable debt and nondischargeable
intentional torts stretches a minefield of negligence and malpractice. In past
years, the Code (and the Acts that preceded it)26 ignored any claim arising
from negligence liabilities, making any claim resulting from the negligent acts
of the debtor dischargeable.27
Because most malpractice claims are negligence claims, the Code's silence
meant that malpractice claims were not excepted from the general discharge.
New cases have begun to erode this general rule, but for some professionals
(2) of the kind specified in paragraph (5) [spousal and child support], or (8)
[student loan debt] of section 523(a) or 523(a)(9) [personal injury claims arising from
drunk driving] of this title ....
Id.
25. Under § 1328(b) a Chapter 13 debtor may receive a discharge without full payment under
the plan, if the debtor cannot complete payments due to circumstances beyond the debtor's
control. In that case, the discharge provisions of § 1328(c) come in to play. This latter section
provides that where a hardship discharge is granted, it "discharges the debtor from all unsecured
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed... except any debt.., of a kind specified in §
523(a) of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c). It is unclear why the scope of § 523(a) claims that
survive discharge is greater for the hardship discharge debtor than for the debtor who manages
to complete his plan. Two reasons are usually given. First, the hardship discharge is just the
Chapter 7 discharge in another guise; second, a Chapter 13 plan must pay out more than a
Chapter 7 liquidation. Whether these reasons are persuasive is a matter of individual judgment.
Paraphrasing "Hamlet," if this be method, there is madness in it.
26. Predecessor statutes were the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867, 1898, and 1938 (the
so called "Chandler Act").
27. In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, only provable claims were dischargeable. In theory, some
negligent claims were not provable and therefore not dischargeable, although it is not clear why
any debtor would worry about the non-discharge of an unprovable claims.
5
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the old rules clearly still apply. The disparity of treatment has led to
inconsistent results for different professions.
A. Physicians
A debtor physician need only refer to one section of the Code when
considering whether his malpractice claims will survive the bankruptcy
discharge. Only § 523(a)(6) exposes the debtor physician to nondischargeable
professional liability claims.2" The threat posed by this section results from
the peculiar nature of medical practice and the history of malpractice law.
Unlike any other field of expertise, the medical profession inevitably
commits innumerable acts of near-battery.29 Battery is, of course, an
intentional tort that occurs when an act of non-consensual, harmful or
offensive touching causes injury.30 Only the timely consent of the patient
keeps these harmful and offensive touchings from becoming consummated
battery.' Even if the consent barrier is somehow circumvented and battery
charged, the malpractice claim may fall squarely within the terms of
§ 523(a)(6).
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge any "willful and malicious injury
by the debtor."32 At a glance, the elements of "willfulness" and "malicious-
ness" would seem to exclude all but the most egregious acts of medical
malfeasance. In practice, the line is quite hard to draw because, especially in
context, the meaning of these words is unclear. 3 For example, some courts
28. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994). Section 523(a)(6) reads: "A discharge under § 727, 1141
.. or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful
and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." Id.
29. "A battery is the unlawful touching ... of the person of another... with the intention
of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact. ... " 6 AM. JuR. 2D Assault and Battery § 5
(1963). Moreover, "a battery, in the legal sense of the term, may be committed although no
physical harm resulted from the act." Id. The fact that surgery begins with a violation of the
integrity of the skin indicates that medical treatment may be harmful in the short term. "[An]
operation is battery [unless there is] . . . consent." 6A C.J.S Assault and Battery § 16, n.91
(1975).
30. Under archaic definitions of battery, a necessary element was the intention to harm. As
American Jurisprudence notes, "This requirement appears to have been relaxed to a certain
extent." 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 6 (1963). In fact, it is more accurate to say that
modem definitions of battery tend to require only that the tortfeasor intend the act, not the offense
or harm.
31. "Consent of a patient to medical treatment may preclude liability for assault and battery
based on such treatment." 6A C.J.S Assault and Battery § 16, n. 86 (1975). "[Ain act done
without the consent of the person affected ... constitutes an assault and battery, as for example,
an unauthorized surgical operation. . . ." 6 AM. JUR. Assault and Battery § 147 (1963).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
33. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, When Does Medical Practitioner's Treatment
of Patient Constitute "Willful and Malicious Injury" so as To Make Practitioner's Debt Arising
(Vol. 48:743
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have held that intentional acts that result in injury satisfy the willful and
malicious standard,34 while others have held that the phrase requires an act
committed with intent to cause an injury.35 Recent cases suggest that if a
physician has reason to know facts that should put him on notice of a defect
in consent or if he has not taken reasonable precautions to protect the patient,
he may well be considered to be acting with the willful and malicious intent
that invokes an exception to discharge under § 523(a)(6).36 These rules hold
true even though the physician's subjective intent may have been to assist the
patient, not to commit an intentional tort, and certainly not to act willfully or
maliciously.
For almost a century, injured malpractice plaintiffs who are also creditors
in their physician's bankruptcy proceedings have pressured the bankruptcy
courts to interpret § 523(a)(6) as a de facto gross negligence standard. This
campaign has been somewhat effective. In 1904, the United States Supreme
Court held that an act characterized as "willful disregard" was nondis-
chargeable under § 523's precursor.37 In drafting § 523(a)(6), the House
Judiciary Committee announced that it intended specifically to exterminate the
looser standard set forth by the Supreme Court. 38 Nevertheless, because the
wording of this section is so similar to the gross negligence formulation used
in many states, a gross negligence standard will likely continue to apply to
medical malpractice claims in bankruptcy.
This should give physician-debtors pause for two reasons. First, a thin line
separates "mere negligence" from gross negligence.39 Often, only a jury's
anger moves negligence into the gross negligence area. At times, larger
cultural factors determine whether an act is gross or mere negligence; for
example, consider "driving while intoxicated" law. Just a few years ago, most
jurisdictions considered this conduct to be mere negligence. Today, it is
considered an act of negligence gross enough to receive its own exception to
discharge under the starched and staid Bankruptcy Code. Whatever it is that
from Such Treatment Nondischargeable Under § 523(a)(6) of Bankruptcy Act (11 USCS §
523(a)(6)), 77 A.L.R. FED. 918 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Impulsora del Territorio Sur, S.A. v. Cecchini (In re Cecchini, 772 F.2d 1493
(9th Cir. 1985).
35. See, e.g., Barclays Am./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir.
1985).
36. See, e.g., Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1987); First Nat'l Bank v. Franklin
(In re Franklin), 726 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984); Stanley v. Cole (In re Cole), 136 B.R. 453
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
37. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 487 (1904).
38. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320-21.
39. Discussing the distinction, Prosser notes that the prevailing view is that "'gross'
negligence is merely the same thing as ordinary negligence, 'with the addition,' as Baron Rolfe
once put it, 'of a vituperative epithet.'" WILL Am L. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 34, at 182 (4th
ed. 1971).
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separates gross from simple negligence, it is surely not defined with a degree
of accuracy that would serve physicians in the already complex world of
medical malpractice. Second, the Code subjects physicians to heightened
scrutiny and less protection because of their greater knowledge and control.4"
In short, physicians contemplating bankruptcy cannot be absolutely certain
their malpractice claims will be discharged-except under the mainstream
discharge of Chapter 13."' This is no easy task, however. To qualify for
Chapter 13, the physician must fit within the restrictive requirements of §
109(e).42 Although recent amendments raised the maximum debt limitations,
some physician debtors may yet not qualify. Adding to the obstacle, the only
debts which are included within the limits of § 109(e) are those which are both
"noncontingent" and "liquidated."4" Courts have debated at great length the
precise meaning of these two terms.' For the purpose of this discussion, a
debt is liquidated if the amount of the debt can be readily ascertained by
reference to an agreement or by simple computation.4" Likewise, contingent
debts are "those claims which depend either as to their existence or their
amount on some future event which may not occur at all of may not occur
until some uncertain time."'
Significantly for physician-debtors faced with malpractice liability, "when
the debtor's liability is of a tortious nature, courts have been reluctant to find
the debt noncontingent where the liability itself has not been fixed prior to the
bankruptcy filing. "4 In very broad terms, any pending tort claim is contin-
gent.4" Whether the debtor disputes the claim (as physicians are likely to do
when faced with malpractice claims) is not relevant to the issue.49 Thus, a
physician who can beat his malpractice claims to the courthouse (no simple
task given the complexity of the bankruptcy process) and who does not admit
40. See discussion infra Part V.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). The physician must owe, on the date of filing, less than
$250,000 of non-contingent, liquidated and unsecured debt, and less than $750,000 of non-
contingent, liquidated and secured debt. Id.
43. Id.
44. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 109.05, (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th
ed. 1996) (reviewing cases that define "noncontingent" and "liquidated").
45. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wenberg (In re Wenberg), 94 B.R. 631, 633 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1988), aft'd, 902 F.2d. 768 (9th Cir. 1990); In re McGovern, 122 B.R. 712, 715
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
46. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 558 (Bankr., N.D. Ind. 1989).
47. In re Ramus, 37 B.R 723, 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984).
48. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 44, at n.12 (interpreting Belt, 106 B.R. at
558).
49. In re Jerome, 112 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). In determining Chapter 13
eligibility, a dispute regarding liability or amount of claim does not cause debt to be regarded as
unliquidated. Id.
[Vol. 48:743
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readily ascertainable claims,5" may be able to discharge his malpractice
liability under Chapter 13.
Not surprisingly, there are two significant caveats to this statement. First,
it is critical to remember that if the physician-debtor seeks a hardship
discharge under § 1328(b)5' and (c),52 the § 523(a)(6) claims will not be dis-
charged. 3 Second, and more important, Chapter 13 contains a "good faith"
requirement that comes into play when a court decides whether or not to
confirm a plan.54 Specifically, the court can consider pre-filing conduct,5"
including the circumstances under which a debt was incurred,56 the type of
debt and whether any portion of it is nondischargeable under other sections of
the Code,57 and the legal and equitable effects of the proposed plan. 8 This
judicial inquiry is so broad that the court can even consider the state of mind
of the debtor. 9 Curiously, the good faith requirement applies only to the
filing of the plan, not the bankruptcy itself.' Abuse of the "purposes or
spirit" of Chapter 13, however, may be considered bad faith sufficient to deny
confirmation.61 In any case, a physician-debtors can count on discharge of
their malpractice liabilities only if they can survive either the "willful and
malicious" standard of § 523(a)(6) or the restrictions of Chapter 13.
B. Accountants
Accountants' work broadly encompasses the rather separate tasks of
auditing, tax return preparation, and management consulting.62 Errors in any
of these roles may cause injury to the client. Fortunately for accountants,
50. See Ramus, 37 B.R. at 726 (stating that there is an exception to noncontingency where the
debtor admits the tort and the amount is ascertainable).
51. Section 1328(b) defines the hardship discharge.
52. Section 1328(c) sets out the debts discharged, including § 523(a) claims.
53. See supra note 25.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994). "IThe court shall confirm a plan if... the plan has been
proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law .... " Id.
55. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 44, 1325.04 (reviewing cases
that have considered pre-filing conduct in the determination of good faith).
56. See Society Nat'l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1992); State
of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersamn), 849 F.2d 237,239 (6th Cir. 1988).
57. See United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982).
58. See In re Ashton, 63 B.R. 244, 247 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986).
59. See In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59, 65 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
60. See Pennsylvania v. Flick (In re Flick), 14 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
61. See In re Ragsdale, 15 B.R. 668, 670 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Baksa, 5 B.R. 184,
187 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 587 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
62. DENZIL Y. CAUSEY, JR. & SANDRA A. CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS 261, 285, 353 (4th ed. 1991).
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however, the Bankruptcy Code and courts would probably grant a discharge
for claims stemming from such errors.63
Historically, courts have been wary of holding accountants liable for much
more than breach of contract.' Yet, with some understandable disregard for
its potential impact on this time-tested limitation, the Bankruptcy Code fails
to distinguish liability for breach of contract from any other "right to
payment."' In essence, the claim arising from an accountant's breach might
as well be ordinary consumer debt; breach of contract claims are discharged
under all chapters in the Code. As one commentator put it, "A simple breach
of contract does not cause an injury which may be excepted from discharge
under Code § 523(a)(6)."'
Recently, courts have expressed a willingness to hear negligence claims
against accountants.' This development has been helpful to a plaintiff
seeking recompense for an accountant's malpractice outside of bankruptcy, but
it does not save the injured client under the Code. In bankruptcy, claims for
negligence still are discharged along with other claims.' Thus, independent
of whether the potential accounting malpractice claim sounds in negligence or
breach of contract, the accountant can count on a discharge-at least under the
old rules.
C. Attonzeys and Other Professionals
A long history of cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code and its
predecessor acts protected professionals from malpractice liability in a
bankruptcy proceeding. The Code traditionally ignored negligence and, by not
63. DUTiEs AND LiABLrrmEs OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS spends an entire chapter discussing
"Risk Management," but it mentions bankruptcy protection in only one small paragraph. The
writers characterize the idea of professionals seeking protection in bankruptcy as "distasteful."
Id. at 534. They then assert that "[slection 523(a)(4) ... prevents the discharge of claims for
fraud or defalcations of a fiduciary," although they do not analyze how accountant malpractice
claims qualify within that section. Id.
64. See Leeds Estate, Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Shepherd, 36 Ch. D. 787, 809 (1887); City of East
Grand Forks v. Steele, 141 N.W. 181, 182 (Minn. 1913). See also CAUSEY, supra note 62, at
55.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994).
66. WILLiAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 47:41 (2d ed. 1994).
Of course, what for a commentator is a "simple breach" can for the client be a financial disaster.
67. In 1913, the court dismissed the negligent failure of an auditor to discover fraud as outside
the contemplation of the parties, that is outside of the contract. East Grand Forks, 141 N.W. at
181. By 1939, negligence was a question for the jury. National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 9
N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939). By the mid-1980s, the liability of accountants was well-enough
established to sustain a comparative negligence defense, as in Devco Premium Fin. Co. v. North
River Ins. Co., 450 So.2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Of course, negligence litigation
against accountants exploded with the savings and loan disasters of the mid-1980s.
68. See discussion infra Part II1.C.
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excepting it from discharge, allowed professionals who were also tortfeasors
to discharge the results of their negligence.69 Without doubt, bankruptcy's
origin in the "law merchant"7' helps to explain this easy treatment of
professionals. Bankruptcy jurisprudence evolved insensitive to issues common
in professional practice. When faced with claims arising from professional
malpractice, the courts simply deferred to the language of the Code and found
no reason to except those claims from the general discharge of debts.71
Section 523(a)(4) is the only section of the Code that comes close to
addressing professional malpractice claims.7" The current wording of this
section provides an exception to discharge for "fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity."73 The various preceding acts used similar
language,74 and the courts have consistently chosen a strict interpretation. In
the middle of the 19th century, courts began to require three elements in order
to justify this particular exception to discharge. First, an express trust had to
exist between the debtor and the claimant.75 Second, the debtor must have
acted in a fiduciary capacity.76 Third, the debtor-fiduciary must have
committed fraud or defalcation. 77
69. See Purcell v. Janikowski (In re Janikowski), 60 B.R. 784, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ii. 1986)
("[N]egligence or malpractice... could not, standing alone, bar discharge under § 523(a)(4).");
Morales v. Tanner (In re Tanner), 31 B.R. 338, 339 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); see also NORTON,
supra note 66, § 47:43.
70. The inclusion of non-merchants in the class of those who could seek bankruptcy protection
was an innovation. "Bankruptcy law evolved from the English bankruptcy legislation, which in
turn traces its roots to the Italian law-merchant," which applied only to merchants, not those
practicing the learned professions. REPORT OF THE COMMIsSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, PART I, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 63 (1st Sess. 1973). One commentator
notes that although the first English Bankruptcy statute was not restricted on its face to traders,
the second, in 1570, was. "The bankruptcy law only applied to 'traders,' i.e., to merchant
debtors. Non-merchants were relegated to the separate 'insolvency' laws. . . ." Charles Jordan
Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
5, 9 (1995). This restriction continued in America through the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, until the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841. That act for the first time extended the protection of the bankruptcy laws
to non-merchants. Id. at 17.
71. "Damages from mere negligence or lack of skill ... do not rise to the level of 'willful
or malicious injury' [to be rendered non-dischargeable under § 523] without a further showing."
NORTON, supra note 66, § 47:43.
72. Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code reads: "A discharge under § 727, 1141 ... or
1328(b)... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny . . " 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)
(1994).
73. Id.
74. For example, § 523(a)(4) is characterized as "substantially the same as § 17a(4) of the
Bankruptcy Act." NORTON, supra note 66, § 47:19.
75. See Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844).
76. See Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 378 (1891).
77. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2nd Cir. 1937).
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1. Existence of an Express Trust
Establishing the existence of an express trust became a threshold issue in
claims against the professional.7' In the leading case, Davis v. Aetna
Acceptance Co.,79 the Court construed the 1841 Bankruptcy Act to require
that a "technical trust" exist before going forward with the dischargeability
analysis.'u Davis was not a case of first impression: It relied upon the hoary
authority of Chapman v. Forsyth, decided in 1844.81 These opinions appar-
ently reasoned that, without a trust, there could be no fiduciary and therefore
no actions in a fiduciary capacity.'2
2. Fiduciary Capacity
Having established the existence of an express trust, the claimant seeking
an exception to discharge was required to show that the debtor also acted as
fiduciary. Merely acting in a fiduciary capacity was not enough-despite the
wording of the statute.'s Indeed, the courts went beyond the language of the
statute and required that the fraud or defalcation be caused by a fiduciary par
excellence.
In bankruptcy settings, the term "fiduciary" has been narrowly construed
to apply only to relationships involving technical or express trusts. An
express or technical trust may be either one in which a formal document is
executed which establishes the rights and duties of the parties, or one in
which trust-type obligations are imposed pursuant to statute or common
law. As a rule, the general fiduciary duty created by a power of attorney
gives rise to an agency relationship, but does not give rise to the fiduciary
capacity required by section 523(a)(4).'
78. Note that neither § 523(a)(4) nor its predecessors state this requirement.
79. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
80. Id. at 333.
81. 43 U.S. 202 (1844).
82. For example, Chapman discusses the statutory requirement for what the opinion calls
"special" or "technical" trusts, and seems to derive from that discussion the necessity for the
bankrupt to have acted in a fiduciary capacity. Id. at 208. Davis discusses the necessity of a true
trust, and follows this discussion with the requirement for the bankrupt "to have been a trustee
before the wrong and without reference thereto." Davis, 293 U.S. at 333.
83. Section 523(a)(4) specifies the requirement of acting "in a fiduciary capacity." 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(4) (1994). However, even under the old Act, courts took great care to narrow the
meanings of this phrase. Justice McLean argued in Chapman that, "in almost all the commercial
transactions of the country, confidence is reposed ... and a violation of these is, in a commercial
sense, a disregard of a trust. But this is not the relation spoken of in the first section of the act."
Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208.
84. Bast v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 174 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Barclays Am./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 879 (8th
Cir. 1985); accord Energy Prods. Eng'g, Inc. v. Reuscher (In re Reuscher), 169 B.R. 398, 400
(S.D. Ill. 1994); Rech v. Burgess (In re Burgess) 106 B.R. 612, 620 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989)).
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Being construed as a fiduciary under non-bankruptcy law likewise was not
sufficient. In order to qualify as "fiduciary capacity" for purposes of §
523(a)(4), an express trust agreement, an identifiable res, and fiduciary duties
arising from the agreement must have existed. Agents, attorneys in facts and
attorneys at law"6 might have been considered fiduciaries in other areas of the
law, but not in bankruptcy.
3. Fraud or Defalcation
While § 523(a)(4) encompasses a debtor who has either defrauded or
defalcated, 7 the bulk of the revolution in professional liability claims falls
squarely on the interpretation of "defalcation." "Fraud" does appear as an
alternative ground in § 523(a)(4), but it has no relevance in the context of
malpractice litigation. After all, intentional torts like fraud lead to either
nondischargeable criminal liability or nondischargeable intentional tort
liability.88 Moreover, the definition of fraud is clear,8 9 and the elements for
fraud are well established. 0
85. Agents, such as those in Chapman, were not considered fiduciaries in the bankruptcy
context. The court provided two reasons for this conclusion: First, the trust imposed upon an
agent is an ordinary commercial trust. Second, any other construction "would have left but few
debts on which the [bankruptcy] law could operate." Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208.
86. The Code of Professional Responsibility defines the attorney-client relationship in terms
of a fiduciary relationship, although without naming it as such. "The professional judgment of
a lawyer should be exercised ... solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising
influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the
desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client." MODEL CODE OF
PRoFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrrY, EC 5-1 (1979). Some states drew the obvious conclusion and
labeled the relationship as fiduciary. See GEORGIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrrY, EC
4-1 (1997). The courts had long been referring to the attorney-client relationship as a fiduciary
relationship. See, e.g., In re Czachorski, 244 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ill. 1969); Smoot v. Lund, 369
P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 1962).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1994).
88. With the exceptions noted for chapter 13. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
89. Torts are refreshingly susceptible to succinct definition. Fraud is "[ain intentional
perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some
valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right. .. ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
788 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
90. The elements are generally agreed to be: "(1) a representation of an existing fact; (2) its
materiality; (3) its falsity; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5)
his intent that it should be acted on by the person to who it is made; (6) ignorance of its falsity
on the part of the person to whom it is made; (7) the latter's reliance on the truth of the
representation; (8) his right to rely upon it; (9) his consequent damage." Swanson v. Solomon,
314 P.2d 655, 657 (Wash. 1957). See also Ardis v. Cox, 314 S.C. 512, 513, 431 S.E.2d 267,
269 (Ct. App. 1993).
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Defalcation is a vague, ill-defined term ripe for creative interpretation. It
has almost no currency outside the fiduciary context.9" The word's curious
lack of definition predisposed it to revolutionary use.
The Code does not define defalcation. The word smacks of archaic
English, but the Oxford English Dictionary provides little assistance.'
Black's Law Dictionary provides little more in the way of elucidation.'
Neither of the dictionaries addresses the questions of greatest significance to
practitioners (and debtors): Whether the act of defalcation which excepts a debt
from discharge must be intentional (as in misappropriation) or merely
negligent (as with failure to account)? Whether the actor must be a public
agent or merely a fiduciary? Whether defalcation requires malfeasance?
The few bankruptcy cases which do define defalcation are not of much
assistance either. In Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst,' the court
attempted an interpretation of § 17a(4) of the former Bankruptcy Act, the
predecessor of § 523(a)(4). In its efforts, the Herbst court traced the term
defalcation from its first appearance in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, through
the former Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and then through colloquial usage.9' The
court eventually threw up its rhetorical hands: "Whatever was the original
meaning of 'defalcation,' it must here [in § 17a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act] have
covered other defaults than deliberate malversations, else it added nothing to
the words, 'fraud or embezzlement.'"96 The court concluded that the scope
of defalcation reaches beyond acts of fraud, embezzlement, or misappro-
priation. 97 At about the same time as the Herbst decision, the Second Circuit,
in In re Bernard,9" held that "misappropriation must be due to a known
breach of the duty, and not to mere negligence or mistake. "I A reasonable
synthesis of these cases might be that defalcation was the general, nonspecific
91. The word has seen something of a rebirth in recent years in the environmental law
context. Cases and articles in professional journals are replete with references to "environmental
defalcation."
92. The Oxford English Dictionary defines defalcation as: "A monetary deficiency through
breach of trust by one who has the management or charge of funds; a fraudulent deficiency in
money matters; also ... a breach of trust by one who has charge or management of money."
4 OXFoRD ENGLISH DICnONARY 369 (2d ed. 1989).
93. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY defines defalcation as, "[ulsually spoken of officers of
corporations or public officials .... Colloquially, perhaps, the word 'defalcation' ordinarily
implies some moral dereliction. As used in the Bankruptcy Act, it may demand some portion of
misconduct, but it is not synonymous with 'embezzlement.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 504 (4th
ed. rev. 1986).
94. 93 F.2d 510 (2nd Cir. 1937) (J. Learned Hand).
95. Id. at 511.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 512.
98. 87 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1937) (J. Augustus Hand).
99. Id. at 707.
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description of any act, by an agent, causing monetary loss to the principal, and
which implied some hint of malfeasance floating unsubstantially about the
usage.
Bringing together the rather vague definition of defalcation and the very
narrow meaning attributed to fiduciary, § 523(a)(4) seemed to require both an
identifiable fund of money and an express trust relationship to render a
malpractice claim nondischargeable. These are not the characteristics of typical
professional liability claims. "
Puzzling as it may seem, it was not until the late twentieth century that
bankruptcy courts began to recognize that their reading of § 523(a)(4)
protected unjust and inequitable behavior that was not protected outside of
bankruptcy. When courts finally began to refuse to discharge professional
malpractice claims, they turned to the words "defalcation" and "fiduciary
capacity" in § 523(a)(4). The historical readings of the these two terms did not
long delay the courts in their desire to make professional liability nondis-
chargeable.
IV. THE REVOLUTION: PROFESSIONALS AS FIDUCIARIES
As noted above, § 523(a)(4) of the Code has served as the professional-
debtor's chief shield from the results of malpractice.10' By necessity,
§ 523(a)(4) has also served as the primary offensive weapon for attacking a
professional's attempt to discharge malpractice liability. The professional-
debtor is allied with more than a century of decisional law, but the strength of
his precedent is weakening. Across the country, bankruptcy courts are
increasingly willing to bar discharge of professional liability claims, and they
are accomplishing their objective by reading the fiduciary requirement of §
523(a)(4) without the restrictive gloss of the old cases.
A. Attorneys
Legal malpractice claims in bankruptcy have spearheaded the revolution.
This may be because of the suspicious regard in which the public holds
attorneys,'"u but more likely, it is because attorneys are considered fiducia-
100. Malpractice claims are, typically, negligence claims. "Legal malpractice, like other forms
of professional malpractice, is a species of negligence." Marks Polarized Corp. v. Solinger &
Gordon, 476 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (Sup. Ct. 1984). See also Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d
1384, 1386 (Ind. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff must prove the elements of negligence in order
to recover in a medical malpractice action). A cause of action for negligence rests not on the
actor's status (i.e. as fiduciary) but on whether the actor's actions met an implied duty of care.
101. See supra Part III.C.
102. "Few people, lawyers or laymen, can deny that the legal profession is now largely
viewed negatively." John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting
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ries in almost every context outside of bankruptcy.103 To treat attorneys as
non-fiduciaries upon initiation of bankruptcy proceedings-with the inequitable
result of shielding them from the results of their own malpractice-might
simply have been too much for the courts to swallow. For whatever reason,
attorneys were the first group of professionals to find that their bankruptcy
haven was no longer secure.
During the summer of 1986, two cases in different jurisdictions (Mas-
sachusetts"04 and Illinois'05) signaled the bankruptcy judiciary's initial
willingness to change. These two cases are stark reversals of § 523(a)(4)
interpretation. Several more courts jumped on the bandwagon in the ensuing
decade. 6 Any of these cases taken separately might be a mere aberration,
but taken together with an opinion on directors' and officers' liability, they
signal a revolution.
In 1986, a Massachusetts attorney named Kwiat filed for bankruptcy relief
under Chapter 7.1o7 Among his liabilities was a two-year-old judgment
arising from a malpractice claim."0 ' In a pre-bankruptcy judgment, a state
court had found that Kwiat had violated a state statute limiting the fees allowed
for a particular class of conduct by an attorney. 19 After two years of appeals
that affirmed the judgement against him, Kwiat filed for bankruptcy relief.1 °
The plaintiff, unwilling to have his judgment discharged, filed an adversary
proceeding to bar discharge under § 523(a)(4) and § 523(a)(6). 111
The court had little difficulty in determining that the attorney's conduct
violated both elements of § 523(a)(4).112 Although the opinion runs several
Responsibility and Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 563,563 (1994). Buchanan brings
together some sources from the popular media. See also Paul Burka, The Tort Tax, _ TEx.
MONTHLY 7 (1996) (discussing "reasons to hate lawyers"). This issue of Tax. MONTHLY
contains an article on a particular tort case. Although the article is entitled The Lawsuitfrom Hell,
the editors billed the article on the cover in more generally condemnatory terms: WHY WE HATE
LAWYERS... A Case Study of What's Wrong with Our Legal System. Id. at cover.
103. See supra note 86.
104. Doucette v. Kwiat (In re Kwiat), 62 B.R. 818 (Bankr. D. Mass 1986), aff'd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, 81 B.R. 184 (D. Mass. 1987).
105. Purcell v. Janikowski (In re Janikowski), 60 B.R. 784 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
106. See, e.g., In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 1994); LSP Inv. Partnership v.
Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d. 779 (5th Cir. 1993).
107. Kwiat, 62 B.R. at 819.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 820.
110. Id. at 819.
111. Id. Bankruptcy Rule 7001 defines adversary proceedings. In general, these are the
proceedings by which a claimant litigates the status of money or property in the bankruptcy
estate. Relevant to this article is that "alan adversary proceeding ... is a proceeding .. . to
object to or revoke a discharge [or]... to determine dischargeability of a debt. .. ." FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7001.
112. Id. at 821.
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pages, the relevant analysis of § 523(a)(4) occupies less than a quarter of a
printed page. The first step of the court's short analysis is a bald assertion:
"Clearly, an attorney holds a fiduciary capacity to this client . . 113 This
proposition, in the context of an attorney malpractice claim, is so obvious as
to be trivial. Most states have both Codes of Professional Responsibility for
attorneys and case law that hold attorneys to be fiduciaries.114 Yet, the
statement is a revolutionary one in the context of § 523(a)(4) require-
ments. 
115
Two sentences further along, the court added the second step in its
analysis, again by stating a naked assertion: "The wrong committed by Kwiat
in his fiduciary capacity was a defalcation."116 The court reached this
conclusion largely because the trial court had already determined (prior to the
bankruptcy filing) that Kwiat had taken the excess fees without his client's
permission and from a sum held in trust for settlement. 7 The Kwiat fact
pattern satisfied all of the traditional requirements of defalcation: (1) an
identifiable res, (2) plaintiff's financial interest in it, (3) a formal trust
relationship, and (4) a malfeasant taking by the trustee. These criteria being
met, debtor Kwiat's situation could easily be seen as a traditional fiduciary
defalcation case. Yet, because the defalcator was an attorney, the court
assumed that he was also a fiduciary and proceeded under § 523(a)(4).
11 8
In reaching its blunt ends, Kwiat cites the other 1986 case that barred
discharge of attorney malpractice liability, In re Janikowski.'1 9 Janikowski
was decided a few weeks before Kwiat and reached a similar result, but there
is no other similarity between the two cases. While the Kwiat court faced an
easy fact pattern, the Janikowski court struggled against well-established
precedent and wrestled with an unruly factual situation in order to avoid an
inequitable result. Of course, it is the Janikowski decision that has the broadest
potential for impact on developments under § 523(a)(4) because the court
stretched the statute further beyond its historical boundaries.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 86.
115. It is ironic that this revolutionary statement is actually a return to a literal reading
discarded by the earlier cases. The bankruptcy statutes have never on their face required a formal
fiduciary relationship, only that actions be undertaken in a fiduciary capacity. The early courts
read this general term very narrowly, as if the statute required a fiduciary officer and a formal
trust. The Kwiat court's literal reading of the statute comes from its rejection of the gloss that
years of usage had built on the phrase "fiduciary capacity".
116. Kwiat, 62 B.R. at 821.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 822 (referring to the debtor's "fiduciary duty as [an] attorney").
119. Purcell v. Janikowski (In re Janikowski), 60 B.R. 784 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1986).
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Waclaw Janikowski and his partner practiced law in the northern district
of Illinois.' 2" While representing sellers (eventually the plaintiffs) in a real
estate transfer, the attorneys managed to violate most of the standards of
practice for attorneys handling real estate transactions. 2 1 The attorneys
recommended the use an improper form of conveyance," failed to record
the deed, and then induced the seller not to foreclose on the defaulting
buyer.'"' Worst of all, the attorneys failed to reveal to the sellers that the
buyer who benefited from their errors was also their client. 24 The plaintiffs
sustained a substantial loss and sued;'" the attorneys filed for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 7V16 Plaintiffs instituted an adversary proceeding
to bar discharge, alleging that the attorney-debtors' conduct fit within
§ 523(a)(4).'27
The length and detail of the Janikowski opinion reveals the court's intense
desire to bar discharge of the malpractice claim. Yet, the court could not avoid
conceding that "courts have consistently held that to be a fiduciary for
purposes of dischargeability, the debtor must be a trustee under either an
express or 'technical' trust and not under a trust imposed ex-maleficio."128
To bar discharge, therefore, the court had to go beyond a constructive or
resulting trust and find a bonafide trust relationship.
The court asserted that attorneys occupied the position of fiduciaries under
state law.' 29 In discussing whether an attorney's status under non-bankruptcy
law satisfied the Code requirements, the court made apparent its intention to
stretch the law and create a way to bar discharge:
Although the courts in interpreting § 523(a)(4) have held the fiduciary
relationship must arise from an express or "technical" trust, the outer limits
of what may constitute the "trust" have never been clearly defined.
Generally, an express trust is created by agreement between the parties to
impose a trust relationship. The usual elements of an express trust
traditionally have included an explicit declaration of trust, a clearly defined
trust res, and an intent to create a trust relationship.' 30
120. Id. at 785.
121. Id. at 786-87.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 787.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 785, 788.
126. Id. at 785.
127. Id. at 788.
128. Id. (citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328,333 (1934); Carlisle Cashway,
Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir. 1982); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Lichstrahl (In re Lichstrahl), 27 B.R. 46, 47 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 788-89 (citing Congress Fin. Corp. v. Levitan (In re Levitan), 46 B.R. 380, 384
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Without question, none of these "usual elements" were present in the
malpractice claim against Janikowski and his partner.
The court found support for its desired result in a contemporary line of
cases holding that "a technical express trust may also be created by a statute
that expressly imposes fiduciary obligations on a party."13 The court
reasoned with some precision:
A fiduciary relationship for dischargeability purposes may exist where a
state statute has defined a particular relationship as a fiduciary. The state
statute creating the fiduciary relationship must, however, have imposed a
trust on the property and set forth the fiduciary duties. Further, the debt
alleged to be nondischargeable must arise from a breach of the trust
obligations imposed by law and not from any breach of contract. Therefore,
the trustee's duties must be independent of the parties' contractual
relationship.
132
To hold the attorneys liable, then, the court in Janikowski needed to find a
statute that imposed a trust on the property and defined the attorney's fiduciary
duties.
What statute supplied the necessary relationship? In this case, none did.
Without explanation and with little rhetorical transition, the court simply held
that "a fiduciary relationship under Code § 523(a)(4) may be established by
[State Bar] disciplinary rules adopted by a state's highest court rather than by
statute." 33 The lengthy and detailed opinion explained neither how a code
of administrative rules could substitute for a statute nor how this disciplinary
code satisfied the traditional requirements of a fiduciary relationship. Unable
to find an appropriate statute, the Court substituted the disciplinary rules, even
though they did not have the full force and effect of law.
There remained for the Janikowski court only the issue of whether the
attorneys' actions constituted defalcation. Typically, defalcation is defined as
the reduction of some fund held by the trustee without permission of the
trustor. The court did not even pretend to assert that Janikowski and his
partner held the plaintiffs' money; it merely noted in passing that "there is no
reason why [defalcation] should not be applied to the improper handling of any
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); Besroi Constr. Co. v. Kawczynski (In re Kawczynski), 442 F. Supp. 413,416
(W.D.N.Y. 1977).
131. Id. at 789 (citing Johnson, 691 F.2d at 252; Allen v. Romero (In re Romero), 535 F.2d
618, 621-22 (10th Cir. 1976); Kawczynski, 442 F. Supp. at 415-16).
132. Id. at 788 (citing Johnson, 691 F.2d at 253; Teamsters Local 533 v. Schultz (In re
Schultz), 46 B.R. 880, 884 (Bankr. Nev. 1985); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Gagliano (In re Gagliano),
44 B.R. 259, 261 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984)).
133. Id. at 789.
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property. " 114 The court ultimately ruled that the malpractice claims against
Janikowski and his partner satisfied § 523(a)(4).135
Although Kwiat and Janikowski holdings are superficially similar, their
differences are vast. Kwiat dealt with an exceptional malpractice case-one
that fell neatly into the formal trust requirements of § 523(a)(4).136 In
contrast, the Janikowski court had difficulty in finding a trust to satisfy the
fiduciary requirement. The court did not identify an express or technical
trust 137 nor did it point to a statute that would establish a trust in lieu of the
express or technical variety. Finally, the Janikowski court did not explain how
a Bar Code of Ethics might satisfy a rule that expressly called for a statutory
pronouncement. 131 In essence, the court announced and then ignored its own
rule. At least the Janikowski court made shorter work of § 523(a)(4)'s
defalcation requirement, nakedly asserting that defalcation might as well
include malpractice. 139
As unsatisfying as Janikowsld's reasoning was, it nevertheless signals a
willingness on the part of courts to except a debtor-attorney's malpractice from
discharge. Kwiat opened the door by recognizing attorneys as fiduciaries, and
Janikowski burst in to show other courts the way toward a liberal reading of
§ 523(a)(4).
By the mid-1990s, more courts began to ignore the historically estab-
lished, formal hurdles of § 523(a)(4) with barely a sideways glance. Courts
even began to sidestep other elements of the older construction, such as the
requirement of an identifiable trust fund. The Fifth Circuit, in In re Ben-
134. Id.
135. Id. at 790. Actually, since the matter came before the court on the debtors' motion to
dismiss the plantiffs' adversary proceeding, it is more accurate to say that court found the
complaint to be sufficient to bar discharge; the issue of dischargeability itself was not before the
court. The court denied the motion to dismiss because the malpractice claims were "far beyond
a mere allegation of attorney negligence or malpractice which could not, standing alone, bar
discharge under § 523(a)(4)." Id.
136. The court never explicitly found that an express trust existed. After discussing the three
elements required for dischargeability under § 523(a)(4), and noting in particular that "there must
either be an express or technical trust," Doucette v. Kwiat (In re Kwiat), 62 B.R. 818, 821
(Bankr. D. Mass 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 81 B.R. 184 (D.
Mass. 1987), the court skips on to the issue of fiduciary capacity. Nevertheless, since Kwiat was
an attorney holding settlement proceeds in trust for his client, it is clear that these funds were
held in trust. Id. at 820-21.
137. The court in Janikowski rather apologetically explained that "several courts have held
that a technical express trust may also be created by a statute which expressly imposes fiduciary
obligations on a party." Janikowski, 60 B.R. at 789. This seems to confuse the requirement of
fiduciary capacity with existence of a trust, but the court was obviously not going to be
sidetracked by details.
138. Id.
139. Id at 789-90.
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nett, 14° stated that "the trust obligations necessary under section 523(a)(4)
can arise pursuant to a statute, common law or a formal trust agreement."
141
The Seventh Circuit jumped even further in In re Marchiando.142 The
Marchiando court pointed to the attorney-client relationship as a patent
example of "the conventional trust or fiduciary setting" 143 that satisfied §
523(a)(4), in contrast to a statutorily created trust that did not.1" By 1994,
attorneys were so well accepted as § 523(a)(4) fiduciaries that a court handling
an unrelated case used the attorney's role as an analogy to justify extending
fiduciary status to directors and officers. 145
Although it would have been unthinkable twenty years ago, attorneys can
no longer count on a discharge for their malpractice liability. They are not the
only professionals to suffer this fate. Even corporate directors and officers,
whom the law has been otherwise reluctant to touch, 146 are now threatened.
B. Directors and Officers
In the revolution of professional liability claims, directors' and officers'
cases now occupy the front lines. When faced with adversary proceedings
involving creditors seeking to bar the discharge of claims against corporate
directors and officers (Ds&Os), courts have split wildly. Some courts have
maintained a strict adherence to the traditional reading of § 523(a)(4), holding
that even Ds&Os who allegedly falsify corporate books and records are
entitled to discharge. 47 One of these courts-a neighbor of the Janikowski
court-expressly and rather stiffly "declined... to depart from the narrower
140. Bennett v. LSP Inv. Partnership (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d. 779 (5th Cir. 1993).
141. Id. at 785.
142. In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 1994).
143. Id. at 1116. "So a lawyer is deemed the fiduciary of his client, even if he does not
manage a fund entrusted to him by the client." Id. at 1115 (citing Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d
1237, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1991)).
144. See id. at 1115-16. Marchiando held a license to sell lottery tickets for the State of
Illinois. Id. at 1113. As such, she was statutorily deemed a trustee, and the proceeds she collected
constituted the trust res. Id. Ms. Marchiando breached her statutory duties to the state by
commingling and pilfering the ticket sales fund. Id. The matter came to a head when Marchiando
filed for bankruptcy. The significance of the case is again the ease with which the court refers
to an attorney as the patent example of a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).
145. Energy Prods. Eng'g, Inc. v. Reuscher (In re Reuscher), 169 B.R. 398 (S.D. I11. 1994);
discussion infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
146. Directors and officers enjoy the shield of the business judgment rule. This rule, in one
of its earliest formulations, holds that "[directors who] act in good faith within the limits of power
conferred, using proper prudence and diligence ... are not responsible for mere mistakes or
errors of judgment." Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 70 (1880).
147. Barber v. Martin (In re Martin), 162 B.R. 710 (Bankr. C.D. Iil. 1993); First Options,
Inc. v. Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 189 B.R. 882 (E.D.
Pa. 1995).
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interpretation of § 523(a)(4), which requires proof of a technical or express
trust." 14' These traditionalist courts cling to a crumbling foothold. A
majority has recently emerged; the dominant thinking seems to be that Ds&Os
are § 523(a)(4) fiduciaries, at least upon the insolvency of the corporation.
49
One case which evidences the majority perspective, In re Reuscher,5 °
defines both the field and the probable shape of future developments in the
area.' 5' Reuscher and Sheible were directors and principals of a corporation
which dissolved involuntarily when it failed to pay its franchise fee.'52
During insolvency, a creditor brought an action against Reuscher and Sheible,
alleging conversion and misappropriation of corporate funds.5 3  Reuscher
and Sheible filed separate petitions for personal bankruptcy, and the creditor
commenced adversary proceedings in both bankruptcy cases to bar dis-
charge.' The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceedings
summarily, holding that "the plaintiffs must establish that an express or
technical trust existed, that the debt was caused by fraud or defalcation, and
that the debtor acted as a fiduciary to the creditor at the time the debt was
created."'155
On appeal, the district court carefully recapitulated both the traditional
interpretations of § 523(a)(4) and the new developments.' The opinion
catalogues the cases that set out the old standard5 7 and the newer cases that
utilize a "broader interpretation" of § 523(a)(4).158 The Reuscher court
quotes Marchiando's attempt to synthesize the two lines of cases:
148. Martin, 162 B.R. at 714.
149. See, e.g., John P. Maguire & Co. v. Herzog, 421 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1970); Berres
v. Bruning (In re Bruning), 143 B.R. 253 (D. Colo. 1992); United States v. Bagel (In re Bagel),
1992 WL 477052 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (mem.). See also Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland,
N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613, *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991) (mem,) (a
non-bankruptcy case holding that "directors will recognize that... in the vicinity of insolvency
... the right ... course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the
stockholders (or the creditors ... ) would make if given the opportunity to act.").
150. Energy Prods. Eng'g, Inc. v. Reuscher (In re Reuscher), 169 B.R. 398 (S.D. Ill. 1994).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 399.
153. Id. The exact nature of the original complaints filed personally against Reuscher and
Sheible was somewhat unclear at the time of the appeal.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 399.
156. Id. at 400-02.
157. Id. at 400 (citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934); Chapman v.
Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202 (1844); Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1987); CRL, Inc.
v. Holmes (In re Holmes), 117 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990)).
158. Id. at 400-01 (citing In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 1994); Bennett v. LSP
Inv. Partnership (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d. 779 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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The key to knitting the cases into a harmonious whole is the distinction
stressed in Davis and other cases between a trust or other fiduciary relation
that has an existence independent of the debtor's wrong and a trust or other
fiduciary relation that has no existence before the wrong is committed. A
lawyer's fiduciary duty to his client, or a director's duty to his corpora-
tion's shareholders, pre-exists any breach of that duty, while in the case of
a constructive or resulting trust there is no fiduciary duty until a wrong is
committed. The intermediate case, but closer we think to the constructive
or resulting trust pole, is that of a trust that has a purely nominal existence
until the wrong is committed. 15 9
Ultimately, the Reuscher court adopted the Marchiando reasoning and further
determined that the Seventh Circuit would include both statutory and common
law trust relationships as eligible for the § 523(a)(4) bar to discharge."6
The Reuscher court faced a high hurdle: no statute defined corporate
officers and directors as fiduciaries. For this reason the court was forced to
hold that common law trust relationships, in addition to express and statutory
trusts, qualified for the § 523(a)(4) exception to discharge.161
The Reuscher court noted that, at common law, corporate Ds&Os were
not necessarily trustees for their corporations' creditors.162 The court,
however, also noted that other courts had held that Ds&Os were trust-
ees-when their corporations became insolvent. "63 By embracing this distinc-
tion, the court was able to avoid the problem of trusts ex maleficio:
Up to the point of insolvency, corporate officers or directors owe no duty
to the corporation's creditors. Therefore, the officers and directors are not
liable for the corporation's debts to such creditors. But when the corpora-
tion becomes insolvent or is dissolved, the officers and directors then
assume fiduciary obligations to preserve and protect the corporation's assets
for the creditors.... [I]f they breach their fiduciary duties-e.g., if they
misappropriate corporate assets for their own personal gain-they will incur
a nondischargeable liability.
When viewed in this context, it is clear that the officer/director's
wrongful conduct does not create the fiduciary duty. Rather, the duty arose
upon the corporation's insolvency or dissolution and the officer/director's
subsequent breach of that duty creates an obligation or debt.'
159. Id. at 401 (quoting Marchiando, 13 F.3d at 1115-16).
160. Id. at 402.
161. Id. at 402.
162. Id. at 402 (citing Beach v. Miller, 22 N.E. 464, 466 (Ill. 1889)).
163. Id. (citing Coleman v. Howe, 39 N.E. 725, 727 (Ii. 1895); Atwater v. American Exch.
Nat'l Bank, 38 N.E. 1017, 1022 (II. 1893); Beach, 22 N.E. at 466).
164. Id.
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Having identified a qualifying fiduciary relationship and a trust, the court had
only to find that the Ds&Os committed a defalcation in order to bar discharge
of the debt.'"
Fundamentally, Reuscher stands for the proposition that directors and
officers are § 523(a)(4) fiduciaries who cannot depend on the discharge of
their professional malpractice liabilities.'6 Its significance is even greater,
though, because it appeals to common law rather than parochial bankruptcy
jurisprudence to interpret § 523(a)(4).
V. CONCLUSION: REVOLUTION AND ITS AFrERMATH
It can be argued that Reuscher is simply one rogue opinion. Only time will
tell. It is, however, more likely that the Reuscher case signifies the culmina-
tion of a revolutionary change in the corpus of bankruptcy law. Three
particular points reveal the progression.
First, consider the court's rush through the traditional analysis. The
opinion barely touches upon the formal hurdles set up by cases which preceded
Reuscher.'67 The Kwiat court visibly struggled to squeeze its holding into the
old paradigms.' 6 The Janikowski court mentioned the paradigms before fully
ignoring them. '69 In its turn, the Reuscher court wrote without even a
pretense of struggle. The Reuscher court serves notice that the traditional
approach of Chapman and Davis no longer holds relevance. More to the point,
the progression from Kwiat and Janikowski to Reuscher and Marchiando
suggests an inexorable movement toward preventing professionals from
escaping their malpractice liability through bankruptcy protection.
165. Reuscher dealt with the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the creditors' adversary
proceeding to determine dischargeability. The issue of whether the directors' and officers' actions
were defalcations under § 523(a)(4) was not before the court. However, the court noted that the
breach of their fiduciary duties as directors and officers would result in a nondischargeable
liability. Id. at 404. Therefore, the court must have determined that the breach was defalcation
under § 523(a)(4).
166. Again, the threat of an exception to discharge for professional liability claims exists in
chapters 7, 11, and hardship discharge under chapter 13. The chapter 13 debtor can count on a
discharge if he completes payments under a plan.
167. The opinion mentions Chapman,Davis, and Klingman. Reuscher, 169 B.R. at400 (citing
Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934); Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202 (1844);
Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1987)). However, it jumps quickly to the "much
broader interpretation" of cases like In re Bennett. Id. at 400-01 (citing Bennett v. LSP Inv.
Partnership (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d. 779 (5th Cir. 1993)).
168. Particularly in its attempt to satisfy the express trust requirement. Doucette v. Kviat (In
re Kwiat), 62 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. D. Mass 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 81 B.R. 184 (D. Mass. 1987).
169. Particularly in its attempt to satisfy the fiduciary relationship requirement. Purcell v.
Janikowski (In re Janikowski), 60 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1986).
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The second telling feature is the Reuscher court's offhand acceptance of
the proposition that attorneys are § 523(a)(4) fiduciaries.17  Professionals
could, in the past, count on the Code's overprotective reading of the term
fiduciary. In the summer of 1994, however, the fight over the meaning of
fiduciary capacity was no longer being contested; the revolution had moved on
to other fronts. Another crucial step in the old paradigm was discarded.
The third and most important point is the Reuscher court's quiet
application of common law in the § 523(a)(4) context.' In the Chapman
and Davis line of cases, courts had steadfastly refused to budge from the
narrow and parochial bankruptcy definition of fiduciary, even for those debtors
who were otherwise universally accepted as fiduciaries. The Janikowski court,
by giving mere lip service to the concept of a statutory trust, took a huge step
toward abandoning the formal requirements of Chapman and other pre-1986
cases. This step becomes a quantum leap, however, as Reuscher relies on the
common law for its definition of fiduciary. If Reuscher represents a move to
use the common law to understand § 523(a)(4), then it is revolutionary indeed.
Standing at the edge of a revolution, it is difficult to predict the direction
of developments to come. Still, a few cases have hinted at what the future may
hold. In re Marchiando, a case which does not superficially appear to
support the thesis of this paper, 7 1 points to the most likely future for
professional liability claims in bankruptcy. Ms. Marchiando owned a conve-
nience store and was licensed to sell lottery tickets for the state.174 When her
store began to fail, Marchiando applied proceeds from the lottery ticket sales
to her daily business expenses. A state statute explicitly defined the
170. "Assuming [that the debtor corporation was declared insolvent and allowed its corporate
charter to lapse], the Court finds that the debtors then acquired a fiduciary obligation to preserve
and protect the corporation's assets for the appellants and other creditors." Reuscher, 169 B.R.
at 403. The court then tackles the question of whether this is the kind of fiduciary obligation
which may create a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4). After a short discussion, it
concludes that "when the corporation becomes insolvent or is dissolved, the officers and directors
then assume fiduciary obligations to preserve and protect the corporation's assets for the
creditors .... [I]f they breach their fiduciary duties-e.g., if they misappropriate corporate assets
for their own personal gain-they will incur a nondischargeable liability." Id. at 403. Nowhere
does the opinion attempt a rigorous analysis of how these common law fiduciary duties satisfy
§ 523(a)(4).
171. Id. at 402.
172. In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 1994).
173. Even ifMarchiando was an exception to the analysis laid out here, "the exception proves
the rule." John Wilson, The Cheats (1664), cited in DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 211 (Bergen
Evans, ed. 1969). The term "prove" meant "test" and not "support." Marchiando by arguing
against the thesis of this paper, tests the thesis and in the modem sense, proves it.
174. Marchiando, 13 F.3d at 1113.
175. Id.
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proceeds from lottery tickets sales as a "trust fund, " 76 and therefore,
Marchiando appeared to be a trustee"r and a fiduciary,"' at least under
state law. When conversion of the trust funds could no longer keep March-
iando's convenience store solvent, she filed for bankruptcy protection.' 79 The
state filed an adversary proceeding to except its $17,000 in uncollected trust
funds from discharge. 8 '
Throughout the proceedings in the bankruptcy court and the district court,
the parties fought over the meaning of § 523(a)(4) and its terms. For the
Seventh Circuit, the key question became the definition of fiduciary under §
523(a)(4). The court carefully reviewed the cases and discovered three
different treatments of the issue in the case law. First were the cases upon
which this article has focused-cases holding that defalcations by professionals
were nondischargeable, even where a fiduciary status was created by non-
bankruptcy statutes or through the actions of the debtor.' The court
identified a second line of cases holding that fiduciary status is conferred only
by the bankruptcy code."m Finally, the court noted that a third line of cases
"divided over the question [of] whether a statute that. . . deems a debtor a
fiduciary.. . makes the debtor a 'fiduciary' for purposes of § 523(a)(4)."'1 3
The Marchiando court ultimately decided that the status of fiduciary under the
Code section requires something more than the liberal usage of the state
statute.
Whether the Marchiando court reached the right decision is not relevant
here. In wrestling with the issue, the Seventh Circuit produced a thoughtful
analysis. This analysis in turn lead the court to derive an implicit factor not
acknowledged in prior cases. The court noted that some cases have found an
actor to be a § 523(a)(4) fiduciary when the fiduciary duties were created in
advance of the breach complained of in the adversary proceeding. "[These]
cases involve a difference in knowledge or power between fiduciary and
principal which . . .gives the former a position of ascendancy over the
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1116.
178. Id. at 1115.
179. Id. at 1113.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1115 (citing as examples, Bennett v. LSP Inv. Partnership (In re Bennett), 989
F.2d. 779 (5th Cir. 1993); Sheerin v. Davis (In re Davis), 3 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1993); Lewis
v. Short (In re Short), 818 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1987)).
182. Id. (citing, among others, Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Corp., 293 U.S. 328 (1934)).
183. Id. The court cites a number of cases not reviewed here: For one side of the proposition,
see Quaif v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 950 (lth Cir. 1993); Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370
(5th Cir. 1980). For the other side, see Coburn Co. v. Nicholas (In re Nicholas), 956 F.2d 110
(5th Cir. 1992); In re Thomas, 729 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1984); Angelle v. Reid (In re Angelle),
610 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1980).
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latter.""84 The disparity in knowledge becomes the key issue in the analysis
of dischargeability:
The fiduciary may know much more by reason of professional status, or the
relation may be one that requires the principal to repose a special
confidence in the fiduciary; both factors are present in the case of a lawyer-
client relation and also the relation between director and shareholder or
managing partner and limited partner.. . . These are all situations in
which one party to the relation is incapable of monitoring the other's
performance of his undertaking, and therefore the law does not treat the
relation as a relation at arm's length between equals."
Marchiando implies that when the party with more knowledge uses that
knowledge to take advantage of the ignorant party, the bankruptcy courts
should be more willing to find the debtor to be acting in a fiduciary capacity
for purposes of § 523(a)(4).
Again, it can be argued that Marchiando is only one case and certainly not
illustrative of the case law in general. Recall, however, that Reuscher cites the
above language from Marchiando with approval.186 Moreover, the disparity
of knowledge issue appears fleetingly in many of the professional liability
cases cited in this article and in much of the modem malpractice law.
A focus on the disparity of knowledge between debtor and creditor makes
a great deal of sense. As several cases note, every debtor is to some extent a
fiduciary of the money and goods provided by the creditor. To go further,
however, and hold that every debtor is a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4) would be
absurd.' Nevertheless, there are situations where the creditor cannot protect
himself from the debtor, "lacking not only knowledge but also the power to
act upon it. "188 As the Seventh Circuit points out, this lack of knowledge
and power may exist between clients and lawyers, limited partners and general
partners, corporate shareholders and the corporation's officers and direc-
tors.1 89 In all of these cases, and in all professional liability claims in
bankruptcy, it makes sense to avoid the metaphysical debates over defalcation
and fiduciary and instead to ask a relatively simple question: Did the debtor
use his superior knowledge and power to take advantage of the creditor? If the
184. Id. at 1116 (citing Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1991)).
185. Id.
186. See Energy Prods. Eng'g, Inc. v. Reuscher (In re Reuscher), 169 B.R. 398, 401 (S.D.
II1. 1994).
187. See Marchiando, 13 F.3d at 1116. The court discusses how, on these terms, a state could
define any of the parties with whom it contracts as fiduciaries and thus earn for itself a preferred
position over other creditors in the event of bankruptcy. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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answer to this question is yes, then the debtor's discharge of resulting claims
under § 523(a)(4) should be barred. That is the direction of cases like Kwiat,
Janikowski and Reuscher, and it is the direction in which the law should
continue to develop if professionals guilty of malpractice are to be denied the
safe harbor of bankruptcy.
Of course, some courts still refuse to look beyond the traditional
requirements of § 523(a)(4)." 9 As the conflict in the cases plays out, the
victory will not necessarily go to the swiftly moving groundswell of judicial
opinion favoring nondischarge of professional liability claims, nor will the
triumph necessarily go to the new liberal interpretation of § 523(a)(4)'s
requirements. But to paraphrase Damon Runyan, that's the way to bet. 1'
190. See First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 162 B.R. 684, 705 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993), aff'd, 189 B.R. 882 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Chapman v. Forsyth, 42 U.S. 202 (1844),
for the proposition that "[i]t has long been the law that a creditor must prove more than just the
presence of a fiduciary relationship before grounds to deny a debtor a discharge on the ground
of defalcation [are] present. In addition, the creditor must prove that an express trust has been
created on behalf of the beneficiary in the relationship."); Barber v. Martin (In re Martin) 162
B.R. 710 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993).
191. "The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong-but that's the way to
bet." THE MODERN HANDBOOK OF HUMOR 218 (Ralph L. Woods, ed. 1967).
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